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Abstract This paper analyzes the effect of ﬁnancial advisor-monitors on
the valuation of real estate investment trust (REIT) mergers.
Advisor choice determinants and the effect of advisors on
transaction value are examined using a sample of REIT mergers
for the 1981 to 2001 period. A two-stage target ﬁrm pricing
model is estimated: the ﬁrst stage (logit) estimates the probability
of advisor use and the second stage analyzes the effect of
advisors on target ﬁrm valuation. The results indicate that
ﬁnancial advisor monitoring, possibly by reducing information
asymmetries, has signiﬁcant positive effects on the value of
REIT acquisitions.
Merger and acquisition activity in the ﬁnancial services sector has increased
dramatically over the last decade. Real estate investment trusts (REITs) have been
at the forefront of this trend. And the pace of merger activity in this sector appears
to have been accelerating in recent years.1 While the reasons for this upsurge in
merger activity are diverse and complex, the overriding factors are likely the drive
for efﬁciency gains and risk reduction necessitated by increasing competitive
pressures.2 Mergers may produce efﬁciency gains by combining complementary
inputs, focusing post merger ﬁrm activities, or generating scale economies.
Mergers may reduce risk by diversifying the ﬁrm’s activities either geographically
or in different product markets or both. Risk reducing mergers generate
efﬁciencies by reducing the ﬁrm’s cost of capital.
At the same time that incentives to merge have increased, legislative and
regulatory initiatives have rendered the acquisition process more complex. New
laws and regulations, a consequence of recent corporate accounting scandals,
require greater documentation and disclosure, particularly for acquiring ﬁrms. The
result has been a large increase in compliance costs for all transaction participants.
A consequence of increasing acquisition complexity is greater reliance being
placed on external ﬁnancial consultants (advisors) by both acquiring and target58  Daniels and Phillips
ﬁrms. These advisors, typically afﬁliated with commercial or investment banks,
are employed to monitor the transaction process. While the new environment
clearly increases acquisition costs, the wealth effects of well-structured REIT
transactions have nonetheless been large due to the strong performance of
commercial real estate in recent years. The most crucial aspect of the transaction
is determining the wealth maximizing transaction price. To this end, ﬁnancial
advisors evaluate, validate, and negotiate transaction terms. Presumably, they
increase market efﬁciency by reducing information asymmetries between
acquiring and target ﬁrms. In this role, advisors are said to perform a monitoring
function.
Several studies attribute wealth gains for corporate mergers monitored by ﬁnancial
advisors to reductions in information asymmetries. Bowers and Miller (1990)
report positive wealth effects in mergers monitored by advisors afﬁliated with top
tier ﬁrms. Hunter and Walker (1990) measure the value of advisor services by the
fees assessed and ﬁnd a positive relationship between fees and wealth gains.
Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial advisory fees vary in accord to
the duration of the principal-agent relationship. Consistent with compensation for
superior monitoring, longstanding relationships include a premium. Kale, Kini,
and Ryan (2003) study the role of ﬁnancial advisors in successful corporate
acquisitions. They report systematic differences in transaction characteristics and
wealth effects based on both the participation and reputation of ﬁnancial advisors.3
This paper extends the analysis of the impact of ﬁnancial advisors on merger
transaction valuation in two ways. First, the focus is on REIT acquisition
transactions, which have not been addressed previously in the literature. Because
estimates of expected cash ﬂows require analysis of localized real property
markets, information asymmetries may be greater in the case of REITs, suggesting
an enhanced monitoring role for advisors and possibly larger resulting wealth
effects. Secondly, the analysis controls for the impact of advisors on different
merger types. For example, the advisor impact of focus driven mergers (in which
principals provide complementary resources to focus the ﬁrms’ activities) may be
different from mergers motivated by geographical diversiﬁcation.
The advisor monitoring effect is analyzed empirically using a sample of REIT
merger and acquisition transactions for the 1981 to 2001 period. A two-stage target
ﬁrm transaction-pricing model is speciﬁed to control for simultaneity bias. The
ﬁrst-stage logit model estimates the probability that ﬁnancial advisor(s) will be
employed. The second-stage pricing model generates estimates of transaction
value conditioned upon ﬁnancial advisor usage. In addition to variables measuring
the quantity and quality of such advisors, the model includes variables to measure
transaction-speciﬁc characteristics.
The results indicate that ﬁnancial advisor monitoring has signiﬁcant and
measurable effects on the value of REIT mergers and acquisitions: the quantity
of ﬁnancial monitoring inputs is positively related to transaction value. Separately,The Valuation Impact of Financial Advisors  59
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the results indicate a strong positive effect of ﬁnancial advisor quality, as measured
by afﬁliation with ﬁrst tier investment banks, on transaction value. This result is
possibly explained by the complexity (greater information asymmetries) of REIT
transactions and the resulting higher returns associated with higher quality
monitoring.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section details the empirical model.
The following section describes the variables, derivations, and predicted
relationships. This is followed by a section that details data sources and presents
descriptive statistics, then a section that details the empirical results. The ﬁnal
section presents concluding remarks.
 The Empirical Model
Financial advisors are monitoring agents employed to maximize wealth: acquiring
and target ﬁrms choose to employ advisors when expected beneﬁts exceed costs.
While wealth maximization motivates the choice to employ advisors, transaction-
speciﬁc characteristics will affect the probability that advisors are employed. In
general, characteristics associated with transaction complexity, such as ﬁrm size,
the structure of proposed ﬁnancing, etc., will increase the likelihood that advisors
are employed. As the ﬁrms involved are larger, and terms and conditions of the
proposed transaction more complex, information asymmetries are more likely.
Thus, advisor use by either or both ﬁrms is more probable. It follows that the use
of ﬁnancial advisors will be correlated with determinants of transaction
complexity, producing simultaneity bias in OLS estimates of advisor use on
transaction value.4 The following two-stage transaction value model is estimated
to control for endogenity:5
ADVISOR*  Z  . (1) i i i
TVALUE  X  IMILL  . (2) i i ii
Equation 1 is the ﬁrst stage logit ADVISOR choice model. measures ADVISOR* i
the non-observable expected beneﬁts of ﬁnancial advisor use and ADVISORi is the
observed ﬁnancial advisor choice for the ith ﬁrm. Firms choose to employ
ADVISORs if ADVISOR* exceeds some threshold level (ADVISORi  1i f
 0 and ADVISORi  0 otherwise). Zi is a vector of variables ADVISOR* i
determining the ADVISOR choice. Equation 2 is the second-stage pricing model;
TVALUEi is the observed transaction value for the ith transaction, and Xi is vector
of exogenous variables deﬁned below. The normally distributed disturbance terms
for each equation are given by i and i.660  Daniels and Phillips
 Variable Definitions, Model Specifications, and
 Predicted Effects
The following list deﬁnes the variables included in X and Z. Three categories of
variables are listed: control variables, ﬁnancial advisor characteristics, and merger
type variables.
Control Variables
SIZE  The ratio of total acquiring ﬁrm assets to the sum of total acquiring
ﬁrm and target ﬁrm assets.
NUMBER  The number of offers considered by the target ﬁrm.
STOCK  A binary variable that equals 1 if the transaction is ﬁnanced with
stock and 0 otherwise.
OPTION  A binary variable that equals 1 if the target ﬁrm transaction involved
stock options and 0 otherwise.
BLOCK  A binary variable that equals 1 if the transaction involved block
purchasers.
DIVEST  A binary variable that equals 1 if the transaction was a forced
divestiture and 0 otherwise.
DIVISION  A binary variable that equals 1 if the transaction was a partial (ﬁrm
division) sale and 0 otherwise.
Financial Advisor Characteristics
ADVISOR  A binary variable that equals 1 if either the acquiring or target
ﬁrm retains ﬁnancial advisor(s).
ADV-TAR  A binary variable that equals 1 if the target ﬁrm retains
ﬁnancial advisors(s) and 0 otherwise.
ADV-ACQ  A binary variable that equals 1 if the acquiring ﬁrm retains
ﬁnancial advisors(s) and 0 otherwise.
AQ-ADV-RANK  A binary variable that equals 1 if the acquiring ﬁrm ﬁnancial
advisor(s) afﬁliation was with a ﬁrm having a market share in
the top 25 in the year of the transaction and 0 otherwise.
TAR-AD-RANK  A binary variable that equals 1 if the target ﬁrm ﬁnancial
advisor(s) afﬁliation was with a ﬁrm having a market share in
the top 25 in the year of the transaction and 0 otherwise.
AQ-AD-NUM  The number of ﬁnancial advisors for the acquiring ﬁrm.
TAR-AD-NUM  The number of ﬁnancial advisors for the target ﬁrm.The Valuation Impact of Financial Advisors  61
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Merger Characteristics
GEO-ACT-FOC  A binary variable that equals 1 if the acquisition is
geographically and activity focusing and 0 otherwise.
Geographically focusing mergers involve ﬁrms in
the same region; activity focusing mergers identify
REITs acquiring other REITs.
GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC  A binary variable that equals 1 if the acquisition is
geographically diversifying and activity focusing
and 0 otherwise. Geographic diversiﬁcation indicates
mergers that are interregional.
GEO-ACT-DIVERS  A binary variable that equals 1 if the acquisition is
both geographically and activity diversifying and 0
otherwise. Activity diversifying indicates REITs
acquiring non-REITs or vice-versa.
GEO-FOC-ACT-DIVERS  A binary variable that equals 1 if the acquisition is
geographically focusing and activity diversifying and
0 otherwise.
MILL  The inverse Mills ratio.
The reduced form of the logit ﬁnancial advisor choice model is given by:
ADVISOR     (SIZE)   (NUMBER)   (STOCK) 01 2 3
  (OPTION)   (BLOCK) 45
  (GEO-ACT-FOC) 6
  (GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC) 7
  (GEO-ACT-DIVERS)  . 8 i (3)
Equation 3 estimates the probability that advisors will be retained by either the
acquiring or target ﬁrm. The variables SIZE, NUMBER, STOCK, OPTION, and
BLOCK relate straightforwardly to transaction complexity and are predicted to
increase the likelihood that advisors will be retained. The remaining variables test
for the effect of merger type on ﬁnancial advisor use. Mergers may be deﬁned as
to whether they focus or diversify the acquiring ﬁrm’s activities. Focusing mergers
result from the combinations of ﬁrms producing a similar product in the same
geographic market (GEO-FOC) or combinations of ﬁrms in the same product but
different geographic market (ACT-FOC). The motivation for focusing mergers
is efﬁciencies attributable to factors such as complementary inputs or scale
economies. Diversiﬁcation mergers involve combinations of ﬁrms in different
product markets in the same area or the same product market in different areas.62  Daniels and Phillips
The merger variables test for the effect of merger-acquisition type on the decision
to employ advisors. Diversifying mergers, particularly geographically, are likely
to exhibit greater information asymmetries, thus raising the probability that
advisors will be retained. Relative to diversiﬁcation, activity-focusing mergers may
be less information asymmetric, suggesting a lower likelihood of advisor use. In
cases where both focus and diversiﬁcation motivations are present, the expected
effect on advisor choice is indeterminate. The model allows the data to reveal the
effect of merger type on advisor use.
The predicted ADVISOR values from Equation 3 are included in the following
reduced form transaction value model:
LNTVALUE     (ADVISOR)   (BLOCK)   (SIZE) 01 2 3
  (AQ-AD-RANK)   (TAR-AD-RANK) 45
  (DIVEST)   (DIVISION) 67
  (GEO-FOC-ACT-FOC) 8
  (GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC) 9
 (GEO-DIVERS-ACT-DIVERS) 10
  (AQ-AD-NUM)   (TAR-AD-NUM) 11 12
  (MILL)  , 13 i (4)
where LNTVALUE is the log of transaction value.7
The variables BLOCK, SIZE, DIVEST, and DIVISION are included in the pricing
model to control for transaction characteristics.8
Large ﬁrm (SIZE) mergers are associated with larger transaction values. The effect
of DIVEST, DIVISION, and BLOCK, however, are indeterminate. Large BLOCK
transactions may either positively or negatively inﬂuence transaction value.
Likewise, divestitures (DIVEST) or division sales (DIVISION), holding SIZE
constant, may affect transaction value in either direction. The effect of these
variables is revealed by the data.
The merger variables are included to control for the expected efﬁciency gains of
different merger types. If markets function efﬁciently, expected merger beneﬁts
will be capitalized in the transaction value. To the extent that mergers promote
efﬁciency gains, all merger types are predicted to positively inﬂuence transaction
value. However, of the three merger types analyzed, larger gains are likely to be
associated with GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC9 mergers. In this study, such mergers are
deﬁned as REITs that acquire other REITs in different geographical markets.The Valuation Impact of Financial Advisors  63
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Because the ﬁrms operate in the same product market, acquirers and their agents
have expertise in evaluating merger beneﬁts. At the same time, diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts may be more likely due to the regional nature of real property markets.
The ﬁnancial advisor variables are the main focus of the analysis in this study.
To the degree that retaining ﬁnancial advisors produces wealth gains for either or
both participants,10 the ADVISOR coefﬁcient is predicted to be positive. In addition
to the overall value-added effect measured by ADVISOR, the quantity and quality
impact of ﬁnancial advisors is also analyzed. TAR-AD-RANK and AQ-AD-RANK
measure the effect of higher quality advisor services for targets and acquiring
ﬁrms, respectively. The quantity of ﬁnancial advisor services is measured by TAR-
AD-NUM and AQ-AD-NUM for target and acquiring ﬁrms, respectively. If larger
quantities and higher quality services contribute to transaction value, the
coefﬁcients of these variables will be positive.
The Mills ratio (MILL, from the ﬁrst-stage equation estimates) is also included to
test for the presence of selectivity (simultaneous equation) bias.11
 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
The primary source of data is the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation
database (SDC). All mergers and acquisitions during the sample period (1981–
2001) involving REIT targets are included. Supplemental data on characteristics
of target and acquirer ﬁrms were obtained from Research Insight. The data is
national in scope and includes a large sample (456) of ﬁnalized merger
transactions. Acquirers include, in addition to REITs, private investors and non-
REIT corporations. The merger transactions are grouped by ﬁnancial advisor
use by the target, acquirer, or both. Exhibit 1 details the distribution of sample
observations by the year in which the transaction was announced (ﬁnalized) and
by ﬁnancial advisor use.
Exhibit 1 indicates a clear upward trend in the volume of transactions over time.
In 1982, only four transactions involved REIT acquisitions, while in 1997 there
were 64 transactions involving REITs. The data also reveal an increased tendency
to retain ﬁnancial advisors in recent years. From 1997 through 2001 more than
50% of all transactions involved ﬁnancial advisors by either one or both parties.
These trends are consistent with the increased ﬁnancial returns and greater
complexity of mergers in the current legal environment.
Exhibit 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the all variables for both
the full sample and separately by ﬁnancial advisor usage. Panel A reports summary
statistics for continuous variables and Panel B reports summary statistics for the
binary variables. Exhibit 2 indicates that the average TVALUE (transaction value)
was $233 million. The standard deviation of $624 billion suggests a relatively
large dispersion for TVALUE. The statistics for the variable SIZE indicate that the
likelihood of ﬁnancial advisor usage increases as the acquiring ﬁrm is larger




































1982 4 (0.95%) 2 (1.32%) 2 (0.74%) 2 (1.69%) 2 (0.66%) 2 (1.14%)
1983 12 (2.85%) 2 (1.32%) 10 (3.70%) 3 (2.54%) 9 (2.97%) 3 (1.71%)
1984 13 (3.09%) 1 (0.66%) 12 (4.44%) 1 (0.85%) 12 (3.96%) 2 (1.14%)
1985 2 (0.48%) 1 (0.66%) 1 (0.37%) 1 (0.85%) 1 (0.33%) 1 (0.57%)
1986 4 (0.95%) 1 (0.66%) 3 (1.11%) 1 (0.85%) 3 (0.99%) 1 (0.57%)
1987 6 (1.43%) 1 (0.66%) 5 (1.85%) 2 (1.69%) 4 (1.32%) 3 (1.71%)
1988 14 (3.33%) 8 (5.30%) 6 (2.22%) 4 (3.39%) 10 (3.30%) 8 (4.57%)
1989 9 (2.14%) 1 (0.66%) 8 (2.96%) 4 (3.39%) 5 (1.65%) 4 (2.29%)
1990 12 (2.85%) 2 (1.32%) 10 (3.70%) 2 (1.69%) 10 (3.30%) 4 (2.29%)





























































Exhibit 1  (continued)















1992 9 (2.14%) 1 (0.66%) 8 (2.96%) 1 (0.85%) 8 (2.64%) 2 (1.14%)
1993 25 (5.94%) 4 (2.65%) 21 (7.78%) 2 (1.69%) 23 (7.59%) 5 (2.86%)
1994 21 (4.99%) 7 (4.64%) 14 (5.19%) 6 (5.08%) 15 (4.95%) 9 (5.14%)
1995 46 (10.93)% 9 (5.96%) 37 (13.70%) 6 (5.08%) 40 (13.20%) 10 (5.71%)
1996 64 (15.20%) 15 (9.93%) 49 (18.15%) 11 (9.32%) 53 (17.49%) 17 (9.71%)
1997 56 (13.30%) 26 (17.22%) 30 (11.11%) 18 (15.25%) 38 (12.54%) 30 (17.14%)
1998 46 (10.93%) 27 (17.88%) 19 (7.04%) 20 (16.95%) 26 (8.58%) 27 (15.43%)
1999 31 (7.36%) 17 (11.26%) 14 (5.19%) 12 (10.17%) 19 (6.27%) 17 (9.71%)
2000 20 (4.75%) 12 (7.95%) 8 (2.96%) 8 (6.78%) 12 (3.96%) 14 (8.00%)
2001 19 (4.51%) 13 (8.61%) 6 (2.22%) 12 (10.17%) 7 (2.31%) 14 (8.00%)
n 421 151 270 118 303 175
Notes: The percentage of the total sample is reported in parentheses. All mergers and acquisitions are completed transactions. Total  the total number of





































Panel A: Continuous Variables
SIZE 0.32 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.29
(0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21)
TVALUE (Millions) $233 $573 $43 $702 $50 $515
($624) ($943) ($104) ($1031) ($99) ($892)
LNTVALUE 3.37 5.22 2.34 5.55 2.53 5.07
(2.27) (1.67) (1.86) (1.61) (1.89) (1.68)
NUMBER 1.47 1.77 1.31 1.94 1.29 1.78
(0.80) (0.86) (0.71) (0.95) (0.65) (0.90)
TAR-AD-NUM 1.16 1.16 0 1.16 1.16 1.00
(0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.56)
AQ-AD-NUM 1.19 1.08 1.22 1.19 0 0.77














































































Panel B: Binary Variables
ADV-TAR 0.36 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.39 0.86
ADV-AQ 0.28 0.62 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.67
ADVISOR 0.36 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.39 0.86
AQ-AD-RANK 0.19 0.43 0.05 0.68 0.00 0.46
TAR-ADV RANK 0.24 0.66 0.00 0.56 0.11 0.57
REIT 0.49 0.66 0.40 0.75 0.39 0.69
OPTION 0.16 0.44 0.01 0.43 0.06 0.38
REGION 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.94
BLOCK 0.19 0.11 0.23 0.04 0.24 0.12
DIVEST 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13
DIVISION 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07
GEO-ACT-FOCUS 0.22 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.21
GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOCUS 0.28 0.51 0.14 0.52 0.18 0.47
GEO-FOCUS-ACT-DIVERS 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05
GEO-DIVERS-ACT-DIVERS 0.44 0.28 0.53 0.19 0.53 0.26
Notes: Values are means by ﬁnancial advisor usage. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The number of observations appears in Exhibit 1.68  Daniels and Phillips
is 0.27 and 0.28 for targets and acquirers, respectively. For ﬁrms not retaining
advisors, the values are 0.35 and 0.33 for targets and acquirers, respectively.
The typical acquirer or target employed one advisor but targets were more likely
to retain advisors as compared to acquirers: target and acquiring ﬁrm advisor use
was 36% and 28%, respectively. The data reveal that advisor usage increases (for
both parties) as more offers (NUMBER) are tendered: for acquirers and targets
using advisors, NUMBER was 1.94 and 1.77, respectively. This trend likely reﬂects
the increased complexity of transactions involving multiple bidders.
The binary variable summary statistics in Panel B of Exhibit 2 indicate that 49%
of all mergers involved REITs acquiring other REITs. However, for the subset of
cases involving ﬁnancial advisor use, the percentage of REITs acquiring REITs
increased to 66% and 75% for acquirers and targets, respectively. This indicates
that ﬁnancial advisors are more likely to be retained in focus motivated REIT
mergers, possibly due to greater information asymmetries.
Private investors (INVEST) accounted for 13% of all transactions but were less
likely to involve advisor use. This may reﬂect reduced information asymmetries
in private transactions.12 The advisor quality variables (AQ-AD-RANK and TAR-
AD-RANK) indicate that 24% of all acquirers used higher quality advisors as
compared to 19% of targets. Only 16% of total transactions involved OPTIONs.
For the subset of observations involving advisors, however, the percentage of
transactions involving OPTIONs increases to over 40% for both targets and
acquirers. The greater advisor use is likely attributable to the increased complexity
of OPTION ﬁnanced transactions. BLOCK transactions are associated with a
reduced likelihood of advisor use. BLOCKs were involved in 19% of total
transactions, but in only 11% and 4% of advisor-assisted transactions for targets
and acquirers, respectively. This possibly reﬂects the greater leverage of BLOCK
purchasers, which may reduce the role of external advisors. Divestitures (DIVEST)
and DIVISION sales accounted for a relatively small percentage (11% and 5%,
respectively) of total transactions. The data imply that DIVEST and DIVISION
sales have little effect on the decision to retain advisors.
The merger type variables suggest that certain acquisition types are associated
with an increased likelihood of advisor use. For example, transactions that were
geographically diversiﬁed and activity focused (GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC) were far
more likely to involve the use of a ﬁnancial advisor(s). For such merger types,
51% and 52% of target and acquirers, respectively, retained external advisors. The
increased usage of advisors probably reﬂects the greater likelihood of information
asymmetries for this merger type. Geographical diversiﬁcation and activity focus
involves acquisitions in the same product market but in distant areas. Because
real estate market performance tends to be localized, information will be more
constrained for such mergers in the case of REITs. Other merger types exhibited
a lower likelihood of advisor usage. For example, transactions that were
geographically diversiﬁed and activity diversiﬁed (GEO-DIVERS-ACT-DIVERS),
which accounted for almost half (44%) of total transactions, utilized advisors inThe Valuation Impact of Financial Advisors  69
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Exhibit 3  Logit Estimates
Variable Coefﬁcient t-Stat




















Note: The dependent variable is ADVISOR. n  421. Pseudo-R2  0.36.
*Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level or better, two-tailed test.
28% and 19% of all cases, respectively, for targets and acquirers. The other merger
type variables (GEO-FOC-ACT-FOC and GEO-FOC-ACT-DIVERS) suggest that
the likelihood of advisor use is not affected by these acquisition types.
 Model Estimates
Exhibit 3 reports the logit advisor choice model estimates (Equation 3). Panel A
reports the coefﬁcient estimates and Panel B computes elasticities evaluated at the
mean value of the explanatory variables.
The results indicate that, as expected, variables measuring the overall complexity
of the transaction strongly inﬂuence the decision to retain ﬁnancial advisors by70  Daniels and Phillips
















Notes: The dependent variable is LNTVALUE. n  421. R2  0.61.
*Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level or better, two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level or better, two-tailed test.
either or both of the principals. The estimated coefﬁcients for NUMBER, STOCK,
and OPTION are highly signiﬁcant and the elasticity’s reported in Panel B indicate
large effects of these variables on the advisor decision. For example, if the
NUMBER of bids increased by its standard deviation, the probability that an
advisor would be retained increased by over 50%. The SIZE of the transaction
and whether or not BLOCK purchasers were involved did not affect the decision
to retain advisors. The latter result may reﬂect the superior bargaining position of
BLOCK purchasers such that the costs of advisors exceed expected beneﬁts. With
regard to the acquisition type variables, the results indicate that GEO-DIVERS-
ACT-FOC mergers had large effects on the advisor choice decision. In cases
involving this type of merger, the probability that advisors were retained increased
by 26%. The other merger type variables, however, did not affect the likelihood
of advisor use.
The pricing model (semi-log functional form, Equation 4) estimates are reported
in Exhibit 4. Of the variables included to control for transaction characteristics
(BLOCK, SIZE, DIVEST, and DIVISION) only BLOCK and DIVEST were
statistically signiﬁcant. Both have positive effects on transaction value and
DIVEST has the largest effect of all variables included in the model. The DIVESTThe Valuation Impact of Financial Advisors  71
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coefﬁcient estimate indicates that transactions involving forced divestiture targets
are associated with an increase in transaction value of approximately 141%. This
result likely reﬂects higher overall quality for ﬁrms that are subject to forced
divestiture. With the exception of GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC, which was positive
and signiﬁcant at the 10% level of conﬁdence, the merger type variable coefﬁcients
indicate no effect on transaction value. GEO-DIVERS-ACT-FOC mergers were
associated with a 47% increase in transaction value, possibly reﬂecting higher
expected returns, which are capitalized in larger transaction values for such
mergers. Geographic diversiﬁcation possibly reduces risk and the post merger
cost of capital; activity focus may generate greater expected gains due to
complementary inputs. These results imply that merger type has a greater inﬂuence
on the decision to retain advisors but that, given that advisors have been retained,
the merger type has only minimal effects on TVALUE.
The primary variables of interest are the advisor use variables. The results indicate
that these variables generally have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on transaction
value. ADVISOR, the predicted probability of advisor usage, is highly signiﬁcant
and the Mills ratio (MILL) estimate indicates the presence of simultaneity bias
(in a simple OLS framework), which is corrected by the two-stage procedure.
Separately, the results indicate that both the quantity and quality of advisor inputs
positively affect transaction value. Both AQ-ADV-RANK and TAR-AD-RANK are
positive and highly signiﬁcant. Further, the magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimates
indicates a large effect of advisor quality on transaction value. AQ-AD-NUM (but
not TAR-AD-NUM) is also positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These results
are consistent with reductions in information asymmetries attributable to ﬁnancial
advisor inputs, which are capitalized in transaction values.13
 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of ﬁnancial advisor monitors on both sides of
the market on the transaction value of ﬁnalized mergers and acquisitions involving
REITs. The ﬁndings indicate that ﬁnancial advisor-monitors employed by
acquiring and target ﬁrms add substantial value to the total transaction. The total
value of merger-acquisition transactions, which utilize the services of investment
or commercial bank ﬁnancial advisers, on average, are approximately 10% higher,
all other factors constant, than similar transactions in which no advisor services
are utilized. Acquiring ﬁrm advisors contribute more (approximately 11%, on
average) than advisors employed by target ﬁrms. Perhaps the most noteworthy
ﬁnding is the effect of ﬁnancial advisors that are afﬁliated with top-tier investment
or commercial banks. The impact of such advisors on transaction value is large.
According to the results, top-tier advisors are associated with a relatively large
increase in total transaction value as compared to transactions monitored by
advisors afﬁliated with lower ranked ﬁnancial institutions. This effect is most
pronounced in the case of target REITs.72  Daniels and Phillips
 Endnotes
1 In 2004, for example, the volume of REIT acquisitions exceeded $220 billion,
establishing a new record.
2 While the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions is
extensive, there are relatively few studies focusing on REITs. The early REIT literature
(see, for example, Allen and Sirmans, 1987; McIntosh, Ofﬁcer, and Born, 1989; and
Elayan and Young, 1994), addressed the effect of merger announcement timing on
acquiring ﬁrm returns. More recently, Campbell, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2001) and Pierzak
(2001) analyze the effect of the ﬁnancing choice (cash vs. stock swaps) on acquiring
ﬁrm returns and transaction value. Sirmans, Worzala, and Zietz (2000) address the effect
of investor type on acquiring ﬁrm returns.
3 In a similar vein, Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2001) ﬁnd that commercial
banks acting as ﬁnancial advisors for target ﬁrms having prior banking relationships
with them, a certiﬁcation effect results in wealth gains for the target ﬁrms. However,
when commercial banks act as ﬁnancial advisors for banking clients who are acquirers,
possibly due to market perceptions of interest conﬂicts, a negative wealth effect is
observed.
4 This methodology follows Trost and Lee (1984), who note that merger transaction value
and ﬁnancial advisor use may be simultaneously determined.
5 Lee (1983) and Greene (1995) use the multinomial logit model to correct for sample
selection bias. In the current analysis, the procedure is used as a sequential model to
correct for the simultaneity bias introduced by the advisor choice.
6 Given that the disturbances in the two regressions are correlated, a simple OLS
estimation produces biased coefﬁcients. To correct for this problem, an inverse Mills
ratio from the logit ﬁrst-stage estimates is included in the second-stage equation.
Including this term in the transaction value model leads to consistent parameter
estimates.
7 To control for time trends, the model also includes binary variables for each year of the
sample period. To economize on space, these variables were omitted from the model
speciﬁcation in Equation 4.
8 Brown and Ryngaert (1991) also recognize the importance of the method of payment
on the transaction value. They develop a model in which the method of payment conveys
information about the value of the bidder. More importantly, they show that cash
acquisitions have a higher transaction value to compensate for the capital gains tax
consequences of cash offers. Due to legal restrictions that limit cash reserves, REIT
transactions are less likely to involve cash only ﬁnancing. Thus, the method of payment
is not included in the analysis in this study.
9 See, for example, Delong (2001) who analyzes wealth effects of focusing versus
diversifying mergers in commercial banking.
10 Three cases may be identiﬁed: (1) acquiring but not target ﬁrms employ advisors; (2)
target but not acquiring ﬁrms employ advisors; and (3) both acquiring and target ﬁrms
employ advisors. Cases 1 and 2 are unilateral wealth maximizing choices. Because
agents are acting on behalf of principals, Case 3 will involve a series of strategic bilateral
interactions (negotiations). Since advisors often engage in a zero sum game regarding
wealth transfers, wealth effects for either of the principals are indeterminate theoreticallyThe Valuation Impact of Financial Advisors  73
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in Case 3. The empirical model speciﬁed here allows the data to reveal the wealth effects
of the ﬁnancial advisor inputs.
11 The presence of selectivity bias in indicated by a statistically signiﬁcant Mills ratio
coefﬁcient. The approach used here is similar to that of Pierzak (2001), who estimates
a two-stage merger pricing model to analyze the effect of favorable tax treatment for
certain REIT types. Pierzak controls for the ﬁnancing choice using a proﬁt model to
analyze the stock versus cash ﬁnancing choice, whereas the model in this study employs
a logit ﬁrst-stage model to estimate the probability that advisors will be retained.
12 Sirmans, Worzala, and Zietz (2000) report greater returns for private investor
acquisitions. They attribute this to greater market efﬁciency, possibly due to reduced
information asymmetries. Private investors may be more inclined to perform the
monitoring function, thus reducing the role of external advisors.
13 The binary variable (which identiﬁed the year of each observation) estimates indicated
no discernable time trend effects and is not reported here. The model estimates were
essentially identical separate speciﬁcations with and without the time trend variables.
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